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Moral Preemption Part I: The Case
for the Disobedient
By H-lmo A. FPJN4
ACTVITIES connected with the civil rights movement and the
movement in protest of Government policy in Viet Nam have force-
fully presented to the public this question: When, if ever, is an
individual, in a democracy, justified in disobeying the law of the state?
The correlative question raised is this: Is a person ever under obliga-
tion to disobey the state? (I am glad the Hastings Law Journal framed
these questions in terms of disobedience to laws of the state and not
merely in terms of disobedience to law. In the generic sense 'law"
carries a presumption of moral legitimacy.)
There has been a recent series of articles critical of "civil dis-
obedience,"' the term itself being a prejudging and foreshadowing
of the conclusion. Because many of these articles are examples of
Gertrude Stein logic-a law is a law, is a law, is a law-I welcome this
opportunity to set the problem in somewhat wider perspective. First,
we should recognize that the civil rights and anti-war movements are
probably the two strongest socio-political forces taking place in
America since the Granger-Progressive-Labor movements laid the
foundations of the New Deal. Second, these movements, rather than
being anarchic or totalitarian, follow the democratic tradition of rely-
ing on courts to hear pleas and render just judgement-even against
the state. Third, three-fourths of all non-violent challenges to state
*A.B., 1929, LL.B., 1930, S.J.D., 1945, Cornell University. Professor of Law, Cornell
University. Consultant, Center for Study of Democratic Institutions. Member, New York
Bar. An original paper on civil disobedience was presented at the Center November
5-12, 1965 and will be published by the Center in its regular series.
1 Black, The Problem of the Compatibility of Civil Disobedience with American
Institutions of Government, 43 TEXAS L. BEv. 492 (1965); Freund, Civil Rights and the
Limits of Law, 14 BrFFA o L. REv. 199 (1964); Keaton, The Morality of Civil Dis-
obedience, 43 TEXAS L. REv. 507 (1965); Leibman, Civil Disobedience: A Threat to
Our Law Society, 51 A.B.A.J. 645 (1965); MacGuigan, Civil Disobedience and Natural
Law, 11 CTaoic LAw?119 1965); Tweed, Segal & Packer, Civil Rights and Disobe-
dience to Law: A Lawyers View, 36 N.Y.S.B.J. 290 (1964); Waldman, Civil Rights-
Yes; Civil Disobedience--No, 37 N.Y.S.B.J. 331 (1965); Wasserstrom, The Obligation
to Obey the Law, 10 U.C.L.A.L. 1Ev. 780 (1963); Civil Disobedience and the Law: A
SympoSiume, 3 AssaucAxr CIm. L.Q. 11 (1964); Note, Civil Disobedience in the Civil
Rights Movement: To What Extent Protected and Sanctioned?, 16 W. Ran. L. REv. 711
(1965).
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action or policy are totally obedient and admittedly legal-distribution
of pamphlets on Viet Nam or segregation, programs of voter regis-
tration, teach-ins, and parades and picketing. (The leader of the
second Oakland march termed that activity "massive civil obedience.")
Fourth, these movements claim to be in accordance with the "true
spirit of the law" even though they violate a specific law in their
challenge of what they judge to be anti-legal forces or orders. Fifth,
none of the refusals to obey state orders have been violent or irrespon-
sible; they have been anti-injustice, anti-war, equalitarian and non-
violent. Sixth, many of these challenges have been examples of the
education community attempting to play its proper role within an
emerging and developing Constitution.
Since we are considering non-violent disobedience to state com-
mands, a brief note on non-violence is appropriate.2 The disobedience
we are studying has at least these characteristics: (1) It is against
the state or civitas, (2) it is an intentional act, (3) but does not
embody criminal intent, (4) it is non-violent in origin, (5) it is used
for an external purpose, (6) most frequently as a form of communi-
cation within first amendment theory, (7) it claims justification is
some "higher law" doctrine-whether that be "natural law," "Nurem-
berg," "federal supremacy," or "conscience."
The Plan of This Article
I do not intend to deal extensively with the philosophy of dis-
obedience or with the doctrine of "natural law," nor do I speak in the
positivist tradition (the latter two approaches are taken by others in
this symposium). I intend to make the following brief points:
(1) Disobedience to state commands may be required by the
Nuremberg Principles, if they have the binding force of a treaty of the
United States.
2 Participants in non-violent civil disobedience are varyingly motivated. Some use
this type of activity to object dramatically to state or private action because they believe
that there is no other effective means of objection available. This may be called "neces-
sitous non-violence." A second use is "non-violent coercion." Here the objective is to
modify the conduct of others, even against their will. A third use of non-violent civil
disobedience is in the Gandhian tradition, and it rnay be called "Gandhian direct action,"
or "satyagraha." The literal translation of "satyagraba" is "truthfirmness," and the liberal
meaning of the word is best stated in the phrase "through voluntary suffering spealcing
truth to power." A fourth use might be called "active pacifism." Here the motivation is
based on acceptance, as a way of life, of a pacifism involving affirmative acts of good
will and reconciliation as a counterforce to the abuse of power. The assumption is that
power tends to be irresponsible and exploitive, but it can be overcome by trusting, daring,
challenging love. Thoreau's concept would seem to be that civil disobedience should be
directed primarily, if not only, at the state; this concept might be considered a fifth use.
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(2) Disobedience to state commands has always been recognized
as an appropriate (and perhaps the only) procedure for challenging
law or policy and obtaining court determination of the validity of the
command disobeyed.
(3) Theories of jurisprudence other than "natural law" recognize
the propriety of non-violent challenge to the state.
(4) The obligation to obey the law is not absolute, but relative,
and must allow for some forms of disobedience.
(5) In the theory of an "emergent" and "living" Constitution the
first amendment is increasingly being read "positively" to permit non-
violent forms of what has traditionally been considered disobedience
to the state.
(6) Obedience to "conscience" is the mark of man's maturity and
challenging the state in conscience may be the only way to insure
that the state acts in conscience and consequently becomes mature.
Nuremburg Principles and the Nuremberg Rule
This paper is not an adequate vehicle for the development of the
whole argument that a citizen may be obligated under international
law (and particularly those portions made part of the national public
law) to refuse to obey state orders which are violative of international
law. This principle might be called the Nuremberg Rule, but it is
based upon much additional law.3 In this article I shall merely sketch
the argument.
During the Korean War attempts to validate refusals to pay taxes
which would finance war, on the basis of Nuremberg, were rejected
by the courts on several grounds: a taxpayer had no standing;4 the
Korean War did not violate Nuremberg;5 the taxpayer was too remote
from any possible illegality to be prosecutable. There appear to be no
cases of potential soldiers challenging the Korean War. But the case as
to Viet Nam is quite different; in United States v. MitcheU16 the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of a draftee who
defended on the basis of Nuremberg. Although the major ground for
3 For a discussion of the Nuremberg trials in relation to international law and world
peace see Woim=E, THE NuBEmmERG TsILs iw NTERATIONAL LAW (rev. ed. 1962);
Garcia-Mora, Crimes Against Peace, 34 Fonatn, L. REv. 1 (1965); Glueck, The
Nuernberg Trial and Aggressive War, 59 HAmv. L. REv. 396 (1946); Kranzbuhler,
Nuremberg Eighteen Years Afterwards, 14 DE PAuL L. REv. 333 (1965); Comment,
The Legality of Nuremberg, 4 DUQUESNE L. REv. 146 (1965).
4 Farmer v. Rountree, 149 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Tenn. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 252
F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1958).
5 Ibid.
6354 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1966).
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reversal was lack of adequate counsel, the court said it was "not a
simple case"7 and had serious constitutional issues.
In outline the argument based on Nuremberg is as follows: a) the
trials at Nuremberg were conducted under an executive agreement
which implemented a treaty signed by the United States;8 b) the
principles thereof are the supreme law of the land; c) these principles
have also been made the law of the United Nations;9 d) the agreement
and the treaty which it implements-the Kellogg-Briand Pact-to-
gether condemn three types of activity, at least two of which may
condemn all military action in Viet Nam; e) not only were Nazi leaders
sentenced, but under subsidiary tribunals thousands of ordinary par-
ticipants were tried and convicted;10 f) if American action in Viet Nam
is violative of the Nuremberg Principles, each American citizen who is
aware of this violation bears an obligation to disobey orders which
further the war effort, and to do so at the point where he is most free.
The language in United States v. Ohlendorf'1 is clear:
The subordinate is bound only to obey the lawful orders of his
superior and if he accepts a criminal order and executes it with a
malice of his own, he may not plead superior orders in mitigation
of his offence .... If one claims duress in the execution of an illegal
order it must be shown that the 'harm caused by obeying the illegal
order is not disproportionally greater than the harm which would
result from not obeying the illegal order. It would not be an ade-
quate excuse, for example, if a subordinate under orders killed a
7Id. at 769.
8 Agreement With the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment of the
Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, E.A.S. No. 472 [hereinafter
cited as Charter of London]. The Charter of London is an executive agreement, but it
can be construed as implementing the Treaty With Other Powers Providing for the
Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Power, Aug. 27, 1928, art. I, 46
Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, popularly known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Article 6 of the
Charter of London provides for the punishment of crimes against peace, while the
Kellogg-Briand Pact denounces war as an instrument of national policy. See generally
WLsom, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw STANDARD IN TRATrEs OF ME UN=iuD STATES
25-34 (1953).
Although executive agreements are not made "the supreme Law of the Land," as
are treaties by U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, for some purposes, at least, executive agreements
have been held equal in dignity to treaties. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942);
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 224 (1937).
9 U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 1st Sess., Plenary 1144 (A/236) (1946).
1o For a discussion of some of these subsequent trials see WOEZEL, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 218-44.
114 TwAlS OF WAR Cnm AS B:FoRE rnE NumumERG M=nrLxY TnmmA.s
1 (1949).
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person known to be innocent, because by not obeying it he himself
would risk a few days of confinement. Nor if one acts under duress,
may he, without culpability, commit the illegal act once the duress
ceases.
12
The three types of activity condemned by agreement and treaty,
and punished at Nuremberg, are: 1) crimes against peace, i.e., waging
wars of aggression, 2) war crimes, i.e., violations of the laws and cus-
toms of war, 3) crimes against humanity, including torture, the killing
of civilians, deportations, and forced labor.13 It is argued by critics of
United States involvement in the Viet Nam war that this involve-
ment violates the Geneva Accords of 1954, and such agreements made
by the United States as the SEATO Treaty, and the United Nations
Charter. It is also argued that the "pacification" and "strategic hamlets"
programs as well as bombing, scorched earth, destruction of food
supplies, and alleged torture and refusal to take prisoners violate the
laws of war and constitute crimes against humanity; it is asserted that
the Senate Hearings on Viet Nam bear this out.'4
Disobedience as Procedure and Remedy
In the study of law we recognize that a right (interest) without
a procedure and remedy to protect it is no right at all. Virtually the
only effective and expeditious way for a person to challenge criminal
law is to disobey the law; it is, in general, difficult to enjoin prosecution
or to get a declaratory judgment concerning the validity of a criminal
statute. What we need to recall is that "disobedience" is one of the best
accepted legal procedures.
The Internal Revenue Code requires one to report fairly his income
and pay his taxes-the taxes assessed against him. But the law in this
instance gives him a procedural choice to determine whether the
state's command must be obeyed. He may either refuse to pay (which
in a sense can be considered civil disobedienee actually encouraged
by statute) and go into the deficiency procedure in the Tax Court, or
he may pay (comply) and sue for a refund in the Court of Claims or
District Court.' Similarly, the 1964 Civil Rights Act 6 provides
12Id. at 470-71.
'3 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, sec. I1, art. 6, in Charter of London.
14 It is not the purpose of this writer to try these allegations or pass judgment upon
the arguments. But since knowledgeable lawyers and Congressmen raise the question
of these arguments the moral-legal preemption issue arises.
1 5 INT. RLv. CoDE of 1954, § 6213(a).
1' 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified in scattered sections of 28, 42 U.S.C.).
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protection against punishment for attempts, which do not involve the
use of force, to gain admission to establishments covered by the Act.""
Further, in a sense violation of a contract, which violation involves
litigation challenging the validity of some requirement of the law of
contracts, violation of the anti-trust laws in challenge to some part of
those laws, and open and defiant violation of a rule or order of the
FCC or any other administrative agency all constitute civil dis-
obedience as a procedure for testing the legality of the state-es-
tablished rule that is considered unacceptable.
The Supreme Court has gone so far as to protect a person from
criminal prosecution when he advocates violating a criminal law in
order to test its validity in court.' 8 This is not unlike the issue which
many of the Viet Nam and draft demonstrators raise in asserting that
the Vietnamese war violates international law, as embodied in the
Nuremberg Principles, and that consequently orders directing them
to take part in that war are invalid, in accordance with the Nuremberg
Rule, because they conflict with international law.
It does not seem to this writer that it is valid to suggest that once
the highest court holds a law constitutional the right of disobedience
ceases. This might tend to freeze into permanent law such cases as
Dred Scott v. Sanford,19 Plessey v. Ferguson,20 United States v. Macin-
tosh,21 and other obnoxious decisions, which have since been re-
versed.22 I have not heard anyone suggest that southern officials who
attempt again and again to test the meaning of Brown v. Board of
Educ., 8 or Baker v. Carr,24 or NAACP v. Alabama25 are to be punished
for what is ultimately found to be "disobedience" by them.28
17 Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 311 (1964).
18 Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478 (1945); accord, Okamoto v. United States,
152 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1945).
19 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
20 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
21283 U.S. 605 (1931); accord, United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931);
United States v. Schwhnmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929).22 Justice Douglas has stated to this writer his belief in the minority of one in this
regard. See generally DOuGLAs, THE ANATo Sy OF LiBERTY (1963); DouGLAS, A LIrINc
B.LL OF EiGHrrs (1961); KoNvrrY, FUNnAMENTAL LBERTIES OF A FnaE PEOPLE (1957);
Lewis, The Sit-In Cases: Great Expectations, 1963 SuP,um CouRT REv. 101; Rice,
Sit-Ins: Proceed With Caution, 29 Mo. L. REv. 39 (1964).
23 349 U.S. 294 (1955) modifying 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24369 U.S. 186 (1962).
25357 U.S. 449 (1958).
26 For recent discussions of evasions of Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294
(1955) modifying 347 U.S. 483 (1954), see Calhoun v. Latimer, 321 F.2d 302 (5th Cir.
1963), vacated per curiam, 377 U.S. 263 (1964); Griffin v. School Bd. of Prince Edward
County 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d
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Jurisprudential Theory
There are two theories here-one a very ancient one, and the other
a recent one in whose formulation I have been involved, and which I
believe the United States Supreme Court is in the process of adopting.
The first theory is that of natural law or the higher law. This theory
holds that rulers rule "under the law." This theory, which has met
political crisis, has founded itself in logos, or divine law, and has
allowed man to challenge the validity of positive law. When Antigone
insisted upon burying her brother despite the King's edict that the
body be cast to the dogs, when Christians refused to pay homage to
Caesar's image with incense and wine, when Aquinas insisted that
unjust human laws do not bind a man in conscience, and if they
conflict with divine law the conflicting human law should not be
obeyed,27 when the American colonies declared their independence of
England because "all men are created equal . . . endowed by their
Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness," when the Supreme Court
recognized that "in the domain of conscience there is a moral power
higher than the State"2 -- they all relied upon a higher law, a natural
justice, a code of man's fundamental rights which no political power
can eliminate. And this is the American tradition. Since another por-
tion of this symposium deals with this theory, I shall not discuss it
further.
The essence of the second theory is that non-violent revolution is
within the positive law. From the late 1940s on, I have urged this
position in briefs before the Supreme Court and in articles. 29 It seems
to me that the Supreme Court was trying to commit itself to this theory
55 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964); Monaghan, Law and the Negro
Revolution: Ten Years Later, 44 B.U.L. REv. 467, 471-75 (1964). For recent cases
concerned with reapportionment problems since Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962),
see Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964);
Buckley v. Hoff, 234 F. Supp. 191 (D. Vt. 1964), modified per stipulation and afd
per curiam, sub nom. Parsons v. Buckley, 379 U.S. 359 (1965); Toombs v. Fortson,
205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962), vacated in part and aff'd per curiam, 379 U.S.
621 (1965). For discussion of violation of the right of association defined in NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), see Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm.,
372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).2 7 AQuiNAs, THE Sumim.A THEoLoGiAn I-II, question 96, art. 4,c (Ottawa ed. 1941).
28 Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 68 (1946); see Corwin, The "Higher
Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARv. L. REv. 149 (1928);
Freeman, Exemptions from Civil Responsibilities, 20 Omo ST. L.J. 437 (1959); Freeman,
A Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 806 (1958); Freeman, Civil Liberties
-Acid Test of Democracy, 43 MmN. L. REv. 511 (1959).
29 See articles cited note 28 supra.
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when in the cases of Dennis v. United States0 and Yates v. United
States"' it affirmed the proposition that it is the basic premise of our
political system that change is to be brought about by non-violent
constitutional process and that our Constitution sought to leave no
excuse for violent attack on the status quo by providing a legal alter-
native-attack by ballot. The constitutional right to influence the
electorate by press, speech, and assembly includes even freedom to
advocate transition to communism by means of ballot box, but it does
not include the practice of or incitement to violence.
The Obligation to Obey the Law Is Relative-
Not Absolute
The Obligation to Obey the Law is often stated in absolute terms.
It is sometimes stated as a prima facie self-evident truth. I would
conclude, on the contrary, that duty to obey the law must actually
be presented in relativist terms.
The positive criminal law itself clearly recognizes distinctions
between degrees and character of motivation (e.g., insanity, and
premeditation). The cases mentioned above recognize some relative
right of civil disobedience.
Let us examine the duty to obey the law of the state on logical-
ethical grounds:
It is often argued that whatever is illegal is also immoral. Illegality
- immorality. Law governs morality. But when some law is enacted
which denounces conduct previously legal, this argument presents us
with conflict of two moralities. That which was moral, prior to the law,
is suddenly immoral, faced with the new moral that "what is legal is
moral." When two morals conflict it is generally recognized that which-
ever is the higher morality must control. This returns us to the rela-
tivist view taken by the disobedient.
A variant of the above argument, requiring obedience to state law
without exception, would be that obedience to law is just a matter of
law (the consideration of morals is omitted). What is illegal is illegal.
The law creates its own duty. This view is essentially totalitarian. The
argument takes no account of higher moral or "higher law" obligations.
Consequently this argument leaves the citizen with a hierarchy of
obligations question. But in examining both this and the former argu-
ment it should be remembered that the Supreme Court has recognized
that conscience contains "a moral power higher than the State."32
30341 U.S. 494 (1951).
31354 U.S. 298 (1957).
32 Girouard v. United States, 321 U.S. 61, 68 (1946).
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In order to state all of the logical alternatives corollary to the argu-
ments just reviewed, one would have to recognize the proposition that
no act which is moral can be illegal (or the obverse: No act which
is immoral can be legal). Morality = legality. Morality, therefore,
governs law. This need not be labored. It is the "higher law," and
Aquinas', argument. It is clearly relativist and puts morality in the
driver's seat.
Another position would be that each case is unique, that until the
applicability of the law to each person has been decided, he has the
option to obey or refuse to obey and have the issue tried out. Even if
he has to go to jail eventually, democracy gives him at least this choice.
This "option in a democracy" argument can be expanded into two
variations of a fifth position. One side would argue that "whatever is
democratically enacted must be obeyed" (51 per cent, or majority,
enacted, 49 per cent, or minority, bound). The opposing side would
argue that democracy is precisely the place where civil disobedience
by a minority should be employed to press for reconsideration of laws.
Since ill-conceived or immoral laws do in fact get enacted, any
minority (as Justice Douglas says, even the minority of one) has all
the non-violent extensions of the right of free speech (picketing, sit-
ins, demonstrations) to ask dramatically for reconsideration. A rule
that disobedience is never justified would deaden both moral and
democratic sensitivity and prevent legal change.
It must also be recognized that many laws are disobeyed in another
sense; they just are "not complied with," without this disregard
producing any active concern on the part of the state. For example,
the law says that a will must be executed before two witnesses, that
an affidavit must be made before a notary, etc. The effect of non-
compliance is that the law doesn't protect you. There are also times
when a law may be disobeyed but no sanction is provided for dis-
obedience; such a law is brutum fulmen. There are also times when
what seems illegal is not really illegal (e.g., conflicting laws which
have not been tested). The civil rights sit-in participants argue that
their actions are only apparently illegal-there may have been a
technical trespass under local law, but if the proper law (no dis-
crimination) were applied, there would be no law violation.
Finally, we may very briefly examine two of the most frequently
made arguments against civil disobedience (each needs much more
extensive treatment; here there is room for only an outline). The first
argument is this: It would be disastrous if everyone disobeyed the law.
This is a typically illogical argument from specific to general. The civil
disobedient is not urging disobedience of all laws. He is, however,
March, 1966]
willing that anyone disobey this immoral kind of law. He would never
argue that one disobedience justified all disobedience. Nor is there
proof that others are caused to violate other moral laws by this dis-
obedience or that an ordinary law violator cares a whit about this
violation.
The other argument is: He who takes the benefits of society must
bear the obligations of society. To some degree this phrasing can be
turned into a justification for civil disobedience (as it was by the
American colonies: "No taxation without representation"). What of
the young, the poor, the disenfranchised, the dispossessed? Aren't
many of them legitimately saying: You ask me to be drafted and
fight a war when I have no place in the decision process, to protect a
system that provides me with no bread, to respect a legal system which
consistently protects to me no rights? Sir, this is a two way street. You
ask me to assume duties without rights; I demand rights and only then
can I be expected freely to acknowledge my duties. Isn't the "benefits"
argument an immoral and illogical one to the extent that there is
failure to fulfill these needs? Isn't it even a case of bad conscience?
The First Amendment May Authorize Some
Disobedience
Recently, under the emerging concept of the "Living Constitu-
tion,"33 there has been a growing emphasis on reading the first amend-
ment positively rather than negatively, in order to guarantee the open
public forum which is necessary for the preservation of democratic
dialogue.34 What is being said here is that the first amendment does
not merely protect private rights but is an affirmative public obligation
of the government to keep the public forum unencumbered and
effective so that the sovereign people may call their government to
account. The true meaning and primary value in the democratic
process lies in the effective accountability of the government to the
people. In earlier writings I have suggested that this proposition is the
only logical theoretical basis for the first amendment decisions in the
33 See generally Miller, Notes on the Concept of the "Living" Constitution, 31
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 881 (1963).
34New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Brennan, The Supreme
Court and the Meikleohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HAuv. L. Rrv. 1
(1965); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877 (1963); Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum, 1965 Summm CounTr REv. 1;
Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment," 1964 SuppmvR CouT BEm. 191; Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is
an Absolute, 1961 Suprmns CouRr REv. 245.
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Supreme Court; I have synthesized statements from seven of the
cases into a kind of American creed and theory of government.3"
The Supreme Court has never in the past worked out a full theory
as to disobedience and the first amendment. It has formulated and
reformulated the "clear and present danger" test, the "redeeming
social value" and "balancing" tests.3 6 Even though the Court may not
have fixed the affirmative limits of right or duty to disobey, it has been
clear as to the negative limits of restraint.
In Musser v. Utah,37 (decided on grounds of vagueness of the
challenged statute) the dissenting justices would have reached the
question of the advocacy of lawbreaking, which they considered as
follows:
In the abstract the problem could be solved in various ways. At
one extreme it could be said that society can best protect itself by
prohibiting only the substantive evil and relying on a completely
free interchange of ideas as the best safeguard against demoralizing
propaganda. Or we might permit advocacy of lawbreaking, but only
so long as the advocacy falls short of incitement. But the other ex-
treme position, that the state may prevent any conduct which induces
people to violate the law, or any advocacy of unlawful activity, can-
not be squared with the First Amendment.38
If recruiting members for the Communist Party (Herndon v.
Lowry"0 ), if playing anti-Catholic records in streets where ninety per
cent of the people were Catholic (Cantwell v. Connecticut"), if con-
demning the war and draft and distributing literature to this effect to
parents of draftees during the war (Taylor v. Mississippi41 ), if refusal
to salute the flag during the war when great national solidarity was
sought (West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette42), do not show
an overriding societal danger,43 how can the activity of demonstrators
35 See Freeman, Civil Liberties-Acid Test of Democracy, 43 MnqN. L. REv. 511
(1959); Freeman, Civil Liberties and You-The 1959 Test of American Democracy, 10
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (1958); Freeman, A Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U. PA.
L. REv. 806 (1958).
3GFor a recent discussion of this formulation and reformulation see Brennan, supra
note 34.
37333 U.S. 95 (1948).
38 Id. at 102 (dissenting opinion). (Emphasis added.)
a9301 U.S. 242 (1937).
40310 U.S. 296 (1940).
41319 U.S. 583 (1943).
42 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
43 See also Terminiello v. Chicago, 377 U.S. 1 (1949); United States v. CIO, 335
U.S. 106 (1948); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1947); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
Marcha, 1966] MORAL PREEMPTION
for civil rights, Viet Nam policy, free speech, etc., present that threat
to the nation, permitting state intervention even to prevent disobe-
dience to the state? The concept is moved one step further in the
literature distribution permit,44 use of parks and streets, 45 sit-in and
mass demonstration cases, particularly the recent Supreme Court
decisions. 40 The Court has also stated that there is a distinction be-
tween violation of law where a third person is injured and a violation
which merely discommodes the authorities, and the Court has required
the state to adjust itself to the citizen's conscience and first amendment
interests. 47 The Court's opinions have referred to the fact that dis-
obedience, by Quakers and others, was what produced first amend-
ment freedoms.
Conscience and the State
Closely related to the "living" and "positive" concept of the first
amendment, referred to above, is a realization, growing throughout
modem society, of the importance of "conscience." It may be that
originally the right of free conscience, which was embraced in freedom
of religion in the first amendment, was viewed as individual and
negative in the sense that it only exempted individuals from adherence
to certain doctrines. But the modem psychological view is becoming
accepted: The immature man is he who requires inflexible rules and
external control, while the matuie man is he who accepts and governs
44 Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938).45 Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S.
268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939). But see Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77 (1949); Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 627 (1950).
46 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965);
Harm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
47 "The freedom asserted by these appellees does not bring them into collision with
rights asserted by any other individuals .... [Tihe refusal of these persons to participate
in the ceremony does not interfere with or deny rights of others to do so. Nor is there
any question in this case that their behavior is peaceable and orderly. The sole conflict
is between authority and rights of the individual." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624; 630 (1943).
"The struggle for religious liberty has through the centuries been an effort to
accommodate the demands of the State to the conscience of the individual. The victory
for freedom of thought recorded in our Bill of Rights recognizes that in the domain of
conscience there is a moral power higher than the State. Throughout the ages, men have
suffered death rather than subordinate their allegiance to God to the authority of the
State. Freedom of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment is the product of that
struggle." Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 68 (1946).
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himself by standards which are set by a rational conscience; and a
mature society must likewise develop a conscience. We may use the
words of Erich Fromm as typical of this thesis:
The mentally healthy person is the productive and unalienated
person; the person who relates himself to the world lovingly, and
who uses his reason to grasp reality objectively; who experiences
himself as a unique individual entity, and at the same time feels one
with his fellow man; who is not subject to irrational authority, and
accepts willingly the rational authority of conscience and reason;
who is in the process of being born as long as he is alive and con-
siders the gift of life the most precious chance he has .... A sane
society is one ...where acting according to one's conscience is
looked upon as a fundamental and necessary quality ... *48
I have traced origin and development of the right of free conscience
in "A Remonstrance for Conscience,"49 and shall not repeat it here. I
believe, with Lord Morley, that the immediate cause of the decline
of a society is a decline in the quality of its conscience.50 I believe in
the classical Quaker statement, "we serve our county best by remain-
ing true to our higher loyalty to conscience." I believe as a lawyer that
law is ultimately grounded in conscience, "that moral sense in man
that dictates to him right, and wrong," and without keen conscience
law will fail. I believe with Laski that "the secret of liberty is always,
in the end, the courage to resist,51 and with Holmes and Brandeis, that
a vital democracy is composed of "courageous, self-reliant men [who
do] not exalt order at the cost of liberty."" The nature of conscience
is sometimes to obey and sometimes to disobey. If society is going to
exist in dependence upon man's moral nature, on his ability to choose
the right course from the wrong-on his conscience-then society
is also going to have to recognize man's right and duty to follow his
conscience even if this leads to civil disobedience. In my judgment it
is precisely "conscience" which can properly be used by state law as
the test for the legitimacy of civil disobedience-it is already the test
("conscientiously opposed") used in determining whether an objector
must be drafted into the Army.53
4 8 FoMM, THE SANE Soc=Tr 275-76 (1955).
49 106 U. PA. L. BEv. 806 (1958).
50 See MoR.Y, ON CONWROMISE (1874).
51 See _xr, LmERTY Ix =E MoDERN STATE (1930).
52 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (concurring opinion).
53 62 Stat. 604 (1948), as amended, 50 U.S.C. Aipp. § 456(j) (1964).
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